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Governments increasingly rely on private prison companies
to manage the daunting demands associated with their ever-
increasing prison populations. The private prison industry provides
governments at all levels (federal, state, and local) with an
alternative to the costly and time-consuming construction of
additional public facilities. Governments, however, have all too
often adopted a flawed pricing strategy, paying private prison
companies fixed per diem rates to house prisoners. This model
both incentivized and tolerated poor conditions with greater
emphasis placed on the industry's bottom line than benefits to the
state, the prison population, or society as a whole.
This article asserts that governments should instead
experiment with cost-reimbursement contracts and outcome-based
incentives. Re-thinking contract types would encourage
governments to engage in strategic, long-term thinking about their
goals for prison, appreciating that a rehabilitative model can
ultimately save the state money and generate other societal
benefits. For example, cost-reimbursement contracts that integrate
programs for mental health illnesses or drug and alcohol
1 WiLLiE NELSON, If You've Got the Money, I've Got the Time, on THE SOUND
IN YOUR MIND (Columbia Recs. 1976).
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rehabilitation may ultimately result in a decrease of the next
generation's prison population.
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It's hard to imagine any greater disconnect between public
good and private profit: the interest of private prisons lies not in
the obvious social good of having the minimum necessary number
of inmates but in having as many as possible, housed as cheaply as
possible.2
INTRODUCTION
With over 2.2 million prisoners,3 the United States has the
largest population of inmates, 4 the highest per capita rate of
incarceration,5 and the most women imprisoned in its vast prison
system. 6 The United States houses an astounding twenty-five
percent of the world's prison population, despite being home to
only five percent of world's population.' Alas, incarcerating
2 Adam Gopnik, The Caging of America, THE NEW YORKER, Jan. 30, 2012, at
72, 74, http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/01/30/the-caging-of-
america.
3 Roy Walmsley, World Prison Population List (Tenth Edition), INTERNATIONAL
CENTRE FOR PRISON STUDIES, (Nov. 21, 2013), http://www.pisonstudies.org/
sites/prisonstudies.org/files/resources/downloads/wppl_ 10.pdf.
' Id. (The U.S. has approximately 2.2 million people imprisoned. China has the
next highest total at 1.6 million imprisoned people.)
' Id. (In the U.S., there are 716 prisoners per 100,000 people. The next highest
among countries with a population over 1 million people are Cuba with 510
prisons per 100,000 people and Rwanda with 492 prisoners per 100,000 people.)
6 Roy Walmsley, World Female Imprisonment List (Second Edition),
INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR PRISON STUDIES, (Mar. 8, 2012),
http://www.prisonstudies.org/sites/prisonstudies.org/files/resources/downloads/
wfil_2nd edition.pdf.
7 Inimai Chettiar et al., REFORMING FUNDING TO REDUCE MASS
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criminals does not appear to lower the crime rate;' indeed,
incarceration appears to have no distinguishable effect on
preventing future crime.'
Not only is our current incarceration system unsuccessful at
preventing crime, it is also extraordinarily expensive.1" American
taxpayers annually spend between $80 billion11 incarcerating
prisoners. Governments12 are forced to spend money on prisons to
keep the community safe; unfortunately, this is often at the
expense of more productive, visible uses, such as crime prevention,
education, and health care. 13 Once a person is imprisoned, they can
no longer contribute to society; instead, they become a full burden
upon it. 14
8 Doran Larson, Why Scandinavian Prisons Are Superior, THE ATLANTIC, (Sept.
24, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/international/print/2013/09/why-
scandinavian-prisons-are-superior/279949/ ("From 2000 to 2010, Indiana
increased its prison population by 45 percent and reduced its crime rate by 0.08
percent.").
9 Oliver Roeder, The Imprisoner 's Dilemma, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT.COM, (Feb. 13,
2015), http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/the-imprisoners-dilenma/#ss-5 ("If I
were speaking to a fellow economist, I'd say the incarceration elasticity of crime
is not distinguishable from zero. At a cocktail party, I'd say that crime no longer
responds to changes in incarceration.").
10 Sharon Dolovich, Confronting the Costs of Incarceration: Foreword:
Incarceration American-Style, 3 HARv. L. & POL'Y REv. 237, 239-40 (2009).
" Tracey Kyckelhahn, Justice Expenditure and Employment Extracts, 2012 -
Preliminary, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, (Feb. 26, 2015),
http://www.bj s.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid = 5239.
12 As these concepts are universally applicable, I will simply use "governments"
or "the government" as inclusive terms to mean governments at every level:
federal, state, and local.
13 Sam Brodey, Arizona's New Governor: We Have No Money for Public
Education, But Let's Fund This Private Prison, MOTHER JONES, (Feb. 12, 2015),
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2015/02/arizonas-new-govemor-just-cut-
education-funding-build-big-new-private-prison (discussing Arizona's $1.5
billion budget deficit, which led to cuts in "$384 million in state programs,
including $75 million in funding for Arizona's public universities [while]
earmark[ing] $5 million for a new, 3,000-bed private prison").
14 Inimai M. Chettiar, The Many Causes of America's Decline in Crime, THE
ATLANTIC, (Feb. 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/features/archive/2015/02/
the-many-causes-of-americas-decline-in-crime/385364/.
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Quite simply, the current approach to incarceration is
neither efficient nor sustainable. Governments at all levels in the
United States find themselves in desperate need for a solution to
the intertwined problems of prison overcrowding and accelerating
prison expenses. Private prison companies promise to help
governments reduce prison management costs by outsourcing. Yet
evidence suggests that private prison companies rarely innovate
and consistently fail to deliver advertised cost savings. A 2001
Bureau of Justice Assistance study demonstrated that, despite
private prisons touting of twenty percent potential cost savings,
governments actually realize only a seemingly statistically
insignificant one percent savings. 15
Moreover, governments struggle to realize the potential of
outsourcing because it rarely contemplates long-term goals with
regard to imprisonment. 16 Historically "incapacitation, deterrence,
retribution and rehabilitation" were the main goals of
imprisonment.17 More recently, intervention and skill development
were added.18 But the emergence of the private prison industry
demoted these goals in favor of private profits. 19
It is time for governments to employ more thorough
contract planning and administration to gain better performance
from private prisons. Government's use of fixed-price contracts20
15 Patrice A. Fulcher, Hustle and Flow: Prison Privatization Fueling the Prison
Industrial Complex, 51 WASHBURN L.J. 599, 604-05 (2012).
16 Avlana K. Eisenberg, Incarceration Incentives in the Decarceration Era, 69
VAND. L. REv. 71, 79 (2016); Alexander Volokh, A Tale of Two Systems: Cost,
Quality, and Accountability in Private Prisons, 115 HARV. L. REv. 1868, 1873-
74 (2002).
71 Fulcher, supra note 15, at 599.
18 Stan Stojkovic, Oversight: Overview of Correctional Oversight: Prison
Oversight and Prison Leadership, 30 PACE L. REv. 1476, 1482 (Fall 2010).
19 Fulcher, supra note 15, at 592.
20 See infra II.Fixed-price contracts); see also RALPH C. NASH, JR. ET AL., THE
GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS REFERENCE BOOK, 243 (4th ed. 2013) (defining
fixed-price contracts are as "a type of contract providing for a finn pricing
arrangement established by the parties at the time of contracting").
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when dealing with private prison services has prioritized easy
contract administration over returns on investment, like cost
savings and lower crime rates, which require more administrative
effort.21
Cost savings and rehabilitation cannot be accomplished
through the use of fixed-price contracts, where private prison
companies are paid a fixed daily rate for each prisoner in its
control. Fixed-price contracting tied to prisoner population leads to
the commoditization of the prisoners. As commodities, prisoners
are unlikely to be rehabilitated. Governments should instead use
incentive based contracts, award-fee and incentive-fee contracts, 22
which occur in both fixed-price and cost-reimbursement
contracts.23 By utilizing incentive based contracts for prison
services, the government can incentivize the private prison
industry to no longer treat prisoners as commodities. As the only
buyer for private prison services, governments should insist that
private prisons truly innovate to find better solutions with
incarceration.
Incentive contracts require the government to better define
its output goals of imprisonment. The government, seeing the
rising cost of imprisonment, and its lack of preventing crime,
21 Stojkovic, supra note 18, at 1486-88 (discussing the goals of prison oversight:
namely, defining the reasonable expectations a society can have of prisons).
22 See 48 C.F.R. § 16.401 (2015). See generally Karen L. Manos, GOVERNMENT
CONTRACT COSTS & PRICING, §4:4 (2015) ("Under an award fee contract, the
contractor's profit is determined subjectively by the Government in accordance
with an established award fee plan; whereas under an incentive fee contract, the
contractor's additional profits or losses are determined objectively, using a
predetermined formula based on the relationship between the contractor's actual
performance and the targets specified in the contract.").
23 NASH, JR., supra note 20 at 141 (explaining that cost-reimbursement contract
is "a contract that provides for payment to the contractor for allowable costs to
the extent provided in the contract"); see 48 C.F.R. § 16.301-1 (2015) ("Cost-
reimbursement types of contracts provide for payment of allowable incurred
costs, to the extent prescribed in the contract. These contracts establish an
estimate of total cost for the purpose of obligating funds and establishing a
ceiling that the contractor may not exceed (except at its own risk) without the
approval of the contracting officer.").
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should look for ways to incentivize the private prisons to help
achieve these goals. While it is costly in the short term,
governments should invest in rehabilitating its prisoners to prevent
them from reoffending after release. By improving stated goals and
properly incentivizing achievement, the government can leverage
the private prison industry to help accomplish beneficial/important
goals. Using incentive-fee or award-fee contracting, the
government can properly evaluate the private prison industry's
rehabilitation of prisoners. Properly defining goals and
incentivizing success can lead to long-term, meaningful, socially
beneficial cost savings for taxpayers.24
Part I will explore the history of prison privatization and
introduce the current state of incarceration. Part II will address
some of the problems associated with fixed-price contracting and
prison privatization. Lastly, Part III will examine the possible
replacement of fixed-price contracting with cost-reimbursement
contracting, specifically cost-plus-award-fee contracts, to gain
more value for the government customer.
I. BACKGROUND/HISTORY
This section will briefly explore the history of punishment
and imprisonment in America from its beginnings as an English
colony to the present day. Subpart A will focus on how prisons
were funded and how the effects of societal shifts in punishment
philosophy and the reemergence of the private prison industry have
shaped funding practices. Subpart B will examine the private
prison oligarchy, starting in the 1980s, and concluding with the
current model, dominated by two monoliths. Finally, Subparts C
and D will examine the current state of imprisonment, focusing
first on the size of the prison system and secondly on the costs
associated with it.
24 See generally Wendy Netter Epstein, Public-Private Contracting and the
Reciprocity Norm, 64 AM. U.L. REv. 1 (2014).
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A. A history of government's use of private
funding to defray imprisonment costs
Since the nation's founding, the United States has faced the
challenge of paying for the incarceration and punishment of its
criminals. Recognizing the potential profit opportunity, private
corporations have always been willing to help the government
defray imprisonment costs. By studying the historical public-
private partnerships in the government's incarceration function, we
can see the emergence of government dependence on the private
sector.
Private corporations have participated in the American
criminal justice system since the American colonial era, when
English companies would sell prisoners to Virginians as servants.25
Imprisonment was not the foremost punishment in colonial times;
instead, punishment generally involved fines, stocks, and
gallows. 26 Jails primarily held debtors and those awaiting trial. For
this service, private jail facilities were paid fixed fees by the local
government.27 On occasion, governments required prisoners to pay
for their own cost of imprisonment.28
25 Michael Ames, Captive Market: Why We Won't Get Prison Reform,
HARPER'S, Feb. 2015, at 34, 39.
26 See generally JON RONSON, So YOU'VE BEEN PUBLICLY SHAMED (2015).
(Ronson explains that public shaming was quite prevalent during the 17th
Century, but had devastating effects. Jails and prisons were seen as much more
humane places to punish people for transgressions, to the point where people, if
they were punished with shaming, would beg for it to occur early in the morning
so that they would be spared the humiliation. One of the most interesting
anecdotes in the book comes from a psychologist in Massachusetts, James
Gilligan, who found a direct correlation between a rise in violence-both
murders and suicides-in prisons during the 1970s and how prisoners were
mistreated and humiliated by prison guards. Once the prisoners were treated
with respect and dignity by guards, violence quickly decreased.)
27 Sharon Dolovich, State Punishment and Private Prisons, 55 DUKE L.J. 437,
450 (2005).
28 Peter J. Duitsman, The Private Prison Experiment: A Private Sector Solution
to Prison Overcrowding, 76 N.C.L. REv. 2209, 2214 (1998). (Prisoners were not
released until their debts to the prison keepers were paid. If prisoners were
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America's movement towards a penal system grounded in
imprisonment began when the first modern American prison,
Philadelphia's Walnut Street Jail, was established in 1790.29 At
this time, governments defrayed incarceration costs by selling
prison labor to private contractors. Under the most common prison
labor lease programs, prisoners worked on plantations, railroads, or
mines. Private companies also used prison labor to manufacture
goods from raw materials sent to the prison. In order to reap the
benefit of prison labor one private company even assumed the
control and the costs of operating the prison.3"
When private contractors used prison labor, contractual and
human rights problems quickly arose. Due to the seemingly
endless supply of prisoners, private companies could disregard the
health and safety of the labor. Prison laborers faced harsh
conditions resulting, at worst, in death.31 Even when it was clear
that the private companies were exploiting the prisoner's health
and safety to maximize profits, contracts were not easily
terminated. 32
In modem America, prison labor is still contracted out to
mitigate incarceration costs. Federal Prison Industries, Inc. (FPI or
UNICOR) was established so that all physically abled prisoners
unable to pay for their release, they were subjected to horrible working
conditions until they could earn enough money to secure their freedom.)
29 Ram Subramanian et al., Incarceration's Front Door: The Misuse of Jails in
America, THE VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, Feb. 2015, at 6,
http://www.vera.org/sites/defaut/files/resources/downloads/incarcerations-front-
door-report.pdf.
30 Dolovich, supra note 27, at 450-5 1.
31 1d. at 452.
32 Id. at 453 ("The reasons for this incapacity varied from state to state and
included the lessee's political connections (as in Louisiana and Kentucky), the
state's dependence on the contractor to provide for the prisoners' needs (as in
New York, where in 1851 the wardens of Auburn penitentiary were forced to
give significant concessions to the contractor running an on-site carpet shop or
leave 'idle more than 300 inmates' and risk the loss of necessary revenue), and
the risk that courts would side with the contractors (as in California), thus
forcing the state to pay dearly to regain state control of its prisons.").
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would work with the goal of providing prisoners a means to
acquire skills that would be beneficial to them after their release.
Concerned with affecting the open market, UNICOR originally
was designed to provide goods for federal government
consumption.33 UNICOR's size peaked in 2007 with 110 factories
and 23,000 inmates enrolled. These highs were short lived as
numbers fell to eighty-eight factories and 14,200 inmates enrolled
in 2011, leaving an astounding 20,000 inmates on a waiting list for
UNICOR positions.34 Inmates enrolled in UNICOR receive
between a minuscule $0.23 and $1.15 per hour.35
In Colorado, prison labor is used to make children's toys,
farm blueberries and grapes, raise fish and other aquaculture for
food, and run a gift shop, which is open to the public. 36 Under this
program, the most a prisoner can earn is approximately $125 per
month, roughly $1.50 per hour. While these rates appear
shockingly low, prisoners working in Texas and Georgia receive
no compensation for their labor. Prisoners may receive higher
compensation if the goods they work on are sold in interstate
commerce under the Prison Industry Enhancement Certification
Program (PIE), 37 where wages are mandated to be in line with
federal minimum wage standards.38
33 Michael C. Groh, FAR (8.602) Gone: A Proposal to Maintain the Benefits of
Prison Work Programs Despite the Restructuring of Federal Prison Industries'
Mandatory Source Status, 42 PUB. CONT. L.J. 391, 395-6 (Winter 2013).
31 U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-743, GROWING INMATE
CROWDING NEGATIVELY AFFECTS INMATES, STAFF, AND INFRASTRUCTURE 75
(2012).
35 BOP: UNICOR, BOP.Gov, http://www.bop.gov/inmates/custodyand care/
unicor about.jsp (last visited Aug. 13, 2015).
36 Graeme Wood, From Our Prison to Your Dinner Table, PACIFIC STANDARD,
(Mar. 3, 2015), http://www.psmag.com/business-economics/from-our-prison-to-
your-dinner-table.
37 See infra notes 238-240.
31 Wood, supra note 36 ("PIE, which has existed by statute since 1979 and
employs inmates in about 35 state prison systems, stipulates that laborers must
receive prevailing wages, which are theoretically no lower than the federal
minimum wage of $7.25 per hour. But after taxes, fees, mandatory savings, and
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Prison labor is also used to mitigate costs of other, non-
prison programs, such as snow removal or firefighting. In
Massachusetts, inmates were paid approximately $3-$4 per day to
remove snow in freezing conditions, while non-inmates doing the
same task were paid $30 per hour. During the winter of 2015,
Massachusetts used 90 inmates in this program, potentially saving
the state as much as $21,330 per day.39 In California, more than
four thousand minimum-security inmates are paid between $1.45
and $3.90 per hour to provide fire emergency response services,
saving the state up to $80 million per year.40
The punishment landscape changed in the 1970s, moving
away from rehabilitation and toward incarceration.4 1 Proponents of
this shift were weary of how effectively government could
rehabilitate criminals. The theory behind incarceration is that if
criminals could not be rehabilitated the best solution is to confine
them in prison, away from their potential victims in the general
public. 42 Incarceration became the default punishment to the
detriment of other punishments like rehabilitation.43
With an increased focus on incarceration, the U.S. prison
system quickly became overcrowded. The War on Drugs 44 brought
money confiscated for restitution or other court-ordered payments, few prisoners
receive more than $3 per hour.").
39 Josh Israel, The Windchill Was Negative 25 Degrees And These Inmates
'Volunteered' To Shovel Snow All Day For $4, THINK PROGRESS, (Apr. 2, 2015,
10:45 AM), http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2015/04/02/3641557/prison-
inmates-mbta-shovel (estimating savings using a comparison based on an 8-hour
work day).
40 Conservation (Fire) Camps, Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation,
CDCR.CA.GOV, http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Conservation Camps/ (last visited
Aug. 13, 2015).
41 JONATHAN SIMON, MASS INCARCERATION ON TRIAL, 37 (2014).
42 Id at39.
43 Id. at41.
11 See generally Seth Harp, Globalization of the U.S. Black Market: Prohibition,
the War on Drugs, and the Case of Mexico, 85 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1661 (2010);
Kenneth B. Nunn, Race, Crime and the Pool of Surplus Criminality: Or Why the
"War on Drugs" Was A "War on Blacks", 6 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 381
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new mandatory sentencing guidelines, 45 which included harsh
mandatory minimums for drug offenses. These laws not only
increased the time an inmate was in prison, but also increased the
total number of inmates in prison.46 Existing prisons were unable
to adequately contain the rising influx of inmates so new prisons
were designed to operate overcapacity by installing plumbing and
electrical systems capable of accommodating the overcrowded
conditions. 47 After the judiciary ordered governments to lower
prison capacity levels, the private prison industry, able to build
new prisons faster than government entities, quickly re-emerged.48
B. History of government's use of private
funding to defray imprisonment costs
1. The rise of the private prison industry
Modem private prison contracting re-emerged in the 1980s
when Corrections Corporation of America (CCA) 49 and GEO
Group,50 the two major oligarchs in the private prison industry,
(2002); Susan Stuart, War As Metaphor and the Rule of Law in Crisis: The
Lessons We Should Have Learned from the War on Drugs, 36 S. ILL. U.L.J. 1
(2011).
15 See 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2006).
46 Fulcher, supra note 15, at 594 ("Drug offenders sentenced prior to the
adoption of mandatory minimum sentences served an average of twenty-two
months in prison, while drug offenders sentenced after the adoption of
mandatory minimums were expected to serve almost sixty-two months in
prison.").
4 SIMON, supra note 41, at 6.
48 Ames, supra note 25, at 39.
19 CCA was incorporated in January 1983 and is currently the largest private
prison company. Yet it was not until November of that year that CCA won its
first contract, a facility for the Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS).
CCA quickly grew, assuming the management of its first facility in January
1984, and opening its first facility in April 1984. CCA: Our History, CCA.COM,
https://www.cca.com/our-history (last visited Apr. 17, 2015).
5' GEO Group incorporated in 1984 as the Wackenhut Corrections Corporation.
GEO Group received its first contract in 1987 with INS. History,
GEOGROUP.COM, http://www.geogroup.com/history (last visited Aug. 16, 2015).
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were incorporated. Today, CCA is not only the largest private
prison company in the United States, it houses the fifth largest
prison population in the entire United States, 51 behind only the
federal government, Texas, California, and Florida.52  CCA
currently owns or operates sixty-four facilities with a maximum
capacity of 84,500 inmates in nineteen states and the District of
Columbia. 53 By its own estimates, CCA manages forty-one percent
of the U.S. private prison market. 4
GEO Group is the second largest private prison contractor
in the United States55 and the sixth largest prison system in the
United States.56 Along with its prison business, GEO Group also
provides security services to the Department of Defense. 57 GEO
Group currently controls sixty-six facilities with over 73,000
51 CORRECTIONS CORPORATION OF AMERICA, ANNUAL REPORT (FORM 10-K), at
5 (Feb. 25, 2011).
52 E. ANN CARSON, PRISONERS IN 2013, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS
BULLETIN, 3 (2014). (Compared to populations as of December 31, 2013 when
the United States Government had a prison population of 215,866 inmates,
Texas had 168,280 inmates, California had 135,981, and Florida had 103,028.
The next highest state population was Georgia's with 54,004 inmates.)
53 Corrections Corporation of America, ANNUAL REPORT (FORM 10-K), 5
(February 28, 2014) (hereinafter "CCA 10-K 2014").
541 Id. at8.
55 GEO Group, ANNUAL REPORT (FORM 10-K), 10-11 (Feb. 26, 2014)
(hereinafter "GEO GROUP 10-K 2014").
56 CARSON, supra note 52.
57 Jenny J. Yang, Small Business, Rising Giant: Policies and Costs of Section
8(a) Contracting Preferences for Alaska Native Corporations, 23 ALASKA L.
REv. 315, 331 (2006). (Wackenhut has come under scrutiny for misusing Alaska
Native Corporation preferences, which provide contracts to Alaskan
corporations without usual competitive bidding procedures. Wackenhut entered
into subcontract deals with Alutiiq Security and Technology to provide forty-
nine percent of a contract so that the Wackenhut/Alutiiq partnership could more
easily secure a contract. A 2004 security services contract with the Department
of Energy in Idaho originally awarded to the Wackenhut/Alutiiq partnership was
cancelled when an Idaho Congressman opposed the deal because of
Wackenhut's misuse of the ANC preference.)
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beds, 58 housing between 69,350 and 70,810 inmates at any given
time.59  Worldwide, GEO Group oversees an approximate
additional 4,000 beds in thirty-two facilities.6 ° With facilities in
Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and South Africa, GEO
Group's international market represents approximately fourteen
percent of its total revenue.61
In 2010, CCA purchased its first prison from a government,
Ohio's Lake Erie Correctional Institution, for $72.7 million.62 Two
years later, CCA intensified its purchasing efforts when it offered
to purchase all of the prisons in 48 states in exchange for a twenty-
year contract, guaranteeing a ninety percent occupancy quota.63 No
states accepted this proposal.64 GEO Group bought the Joe Corley
Detention Center (JCDC) in Montgomery County, Texas, in May
of 2013 for $65 million.65 Montgomery County originally paid $45
million to build the JCDC in 2008, but realized a $20 million profit
as a result of the sale, and now collects $250,000 per year in taxes
and $500,000 a year to manage the facility.66
58 LOCATIONS, GEOGROUP.COM, http://www.geogroup.com/locations (last
visited Mar. 2, 2015).
59 GEO GROUP 10-K 2014, supra note 55, at 63. (The average occupancy rate of
all U.S. prisons was between ninety-five to ninety-seven percent.)6 1 Id. at3.
6 1 id. at 11.
62 Terry Carter, Prison Break: Budget Crises Drive Reform, But Private Jails
Press On, A.B.A. J., (Oct. 1, 2012), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/
article/prison break budgetcrises-drive refonn but-privatejailspress on/.
63 IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST, Criminal: How Lockup Quotas and 'Low-Crime
Taxes' Guarantee Profits for Private Prison Corporations, (Sep. 2013), 3,
http ://www.inthepublicinterest.org/site s/default/file s/Criminal-
Lockup%20Quota-Report.pdf.
6 4 Td.
65 Cindy Horswell, Montgomery County Seeks Answers For Swelling Jail
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CCA's stock price has risen over 239 percent to its
current 67 level of $33.33 since its low of $9.8268 during the Great
Recession (December 2007-June 2009).69 Similarly, GEO's stock
has risen 209 percent, from a low of $11.18 on February 23,
2009,70 to its current price of $34.53 on August 7, 2015.71 In
comparison, Lockheed Martin's stock rose 355 percent, from a low
of $45.94 on March 9, 2009 to its current value of $209.09.72 IBM
rose 116 percent, from $71.74 at its Great Recession low on
November 20, 2008 to a current $155.12. 73 Over this same period,
the Dow Jones Industrial Average rose from a low of $6,594.44 on
March 5, 2009 to its current level $17,373.38, a 163 percent
increase.74 The S&P 500 Index similarly rose from it's recession
low of $676.53 on March 9, 2009 to $2,077.57, a 207 percent
increase.75
A person who invested $10,00076 in CCA stock on August
8, 2005 would have a current value of $38,026.15 on August 6,
67 All references to the current prices are the closing price on August 7, 2015.
68 CWX Historical Prices & Data, NASDAQ.COM,
http://www.nasdaq.com/symbol/cxw/historical (closing price March 6, 2009).
69 See generally Henry S. Farber, Job Loss in the Great Recession: Historical
Perspective from the Displaced Workers Survey, 1984-2010, NATIONAL
BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, (May 2011), http://www.nber.org/papers/
w17040.
70 GEO GROUP 10-K 2014, supra note 55, at 36.
71 GEO Historical Prices & Data, NASDAQ.CoM, http://www.nasdaq.com/
symbol/geo/historical (closing price April 10, 2015).
72 Lockheed Martin Corporation (LMT) Historical Prices & Data,
NASDAQ.COM, http://www.nasdaq.com/symbol/lmt/historical.
73 International Business Machines (IBM) Historical Prices & Data,
NASDAQ.COM, http://www.nasdaq.com/symbol/ibm/historical.
7' Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA), WSJ.CoM, http://quotes.wsj.com/
index/DJIA/historical-prices.
71 S&P 500 Index (SPX), WSJ.CoM, http://quotes.wsj.com/index/SPX/historical-
prices.
76 Computing the value of a stock though the investment of $10,000 allows for a
better analysis of the growth of the company's value because it accounts for
reinvestment of dividends into the stock. For instance, GE stock had a value of
$33.76 on August 8, 2005 and a closing value of $26.03 on August 6, 2015.
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2015, a 280 percent increase.77 A similar investment in GEO
Group stock would yield $54,829.66, a 448 percent return on
investment.78 A $10,000 investment in Lockheed Martin on the
same date would currently be worth $44,803.68. 79 Similarly,
IBM's value increased by 126 percent, from $10,000 to
$22,630.68.8o
2. The two roles private prisons play for the
government
Private prisons operate by filling two, often concurrent,
roles for the government. First, private prisons assist with
infrastructure, building new prisons that are subsequently leased
back to the government.81 Private prisons are able to build much
faster than the government because of the arcane, complicated, and
lengthy procedures that the government has to endure to get
funding approved. In order to build a new prison facility,
governments are often forced to take out public bonds (and thus
become transparent with how it intends to spend public money).8 2
By selling government bonds, governments are forced to ask the
public for approval, which is more difficult to get when the money
Without accounting for reinvestment of dividends, the stock would appear to
have been a loss of $2,289.69 over those ten years (($10,000/$33.76) * $26.03 =
$7,710.31). By reinvesting GE's $8.41 of dividends over that 10 -year period, the
initial investment is currently worth $11,002.55. GE Split History,
SPLITHISTORY.COM, https://www.splithistoiy.com/ge/ (last accessed August 7,
2015) (archived at http://perma.cc/2Z7X-6ZJJ).
77 CWX Split History, SPLITHISTORY.COM, https://www.splithistory.com/cxw/
(last visited Aug. 7, 2015) (archived at http://perma.cc/UE9C-A2QJ).
78 GEO Split History, SPLITHISTORY.COM, https://www.splithistoiy.com/geo/
(last visited Aug. 7, 2015) (archived at http://perma.cc/F529-ZXDQ).
79 LMT Split History, SPLITHISTORY.COM, https://www.splithistoiy.com/lmt/
(last visited Aug. 7, 2015) (archived at http://perma.cc/BP36-BK7M).
80 IBM Split History, SPLITHISTORY.COM, https://www.splithistoiy.com/ibm/
(last visited Aug. 7, 2015) (archived at http://perma.cc/4AP6-2HBX).
81 Dolovich, supra note 27, at 457 (calling this "nominal privatization").
82 Rachel Christine Bailie Antonuccio, Prisons for Profit: Do The Social and
Political Problems Have a Legal Solution?, 33 J. CoRP. L. 577, 591 (2008).
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will be spent on prisons compared to spending on any other
program like education. 83 Some estimates state that it could take
the government up to two years to build a prison, whereas a private
company could do the same job in eighteen months. 84 However,
according to CCA estimates, a private company can build a prison
in between twelve and eighteen months, compared to the forty-
eight to sixty months that it would take a state government to build
a prison.1
5
Governments encounter time and cost overruns occur when
building its own prison infrastructure. The State of New
Hampshire, for instance, began its plan to build a public women's
prison in 20 10,86 yet prison construction is so far behind schedule
that eighteen months before the prison was scheduled to be
completed, the completion date was already delayed by a year.87
Unsurprisingly, the original proposed cost of the prison ballooned
from $38 million88 to a current estimate of $58 million.89 Much of
the blame for the delays and increased costs can be attributed to
New Hampshire's lack of a clear plan. Instead of designing a
prison plan and then out-sourcing, New Hampshire depended on
83 JOHN W. ELLWOOD & JOSHUA GUETZKOW, Footing the Bill: Causes and
Budgetary Consequences of State Spending on Corrections in Do PRISONS
MAKE Us SAFER? THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE PRISON BOOM, 229 (2009).
84 Antonuccio, supra note 82, at 580.
85 CCA At A Glance, CCA.CoM, http://www.cca.com/Media/Default/
documents/CCA-Resource-Center/CCAAt-a-Glance.pdf (last visited Mar. 2,
2015).
86 Lynne Tuohy, New Women's Prison in Concord May Not Have Enough Beds
When it Opens, CONCORD MONITOR, (Dec. 2, 2014),
http://www.concordmonitor.com/news/cops/courts/fires/14623221-95/new-
womens-prison-in-concord-may-not-have-enough-beds-when-it-opens.
87 Jeremy Blackman, Swelling Prison Price Tag Not Entirely a Surprise,
CONCORD MONITOR, (Mar. 19, 2015), http://www.concordmonitor.com/
community/town-by-town/concord/16161773-95/swelling-prison-price-tag-not-
entirely-a-surprise. (In December 2014, the anticipated opening in October 2016
was postponed a year to October 2017.)88 ld.
8 9 Jd.
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the contractors and architects to design the building providing only
the budget as guidance. 90 The prison has a design capacity of 224
beds and yet, due to the delays in construction, the prison is
already scheduled to open overcapacity. 91
Secondly, private prisons provide staffing and operation
services to the government within the government-owned
facilities. 92 The recent prison closure in Willacy County, Texas
provides an example of the vulnerabilities governments could
encounter when contracting in this manner. By contracting with a
private company, the government takes on tremendous risk; if the
private prison firm does not provide its obligated service, the
government can be left with crippling debts and significant job
losses for its citizens. A riot by prisoners in February 2015 left the
Willacy County Correctional Center (hereinafter, "Willacy") in a
state of ruin. 93 Willacy County initially built the prison to attract a
prison contractor to run the facility (ultimately used for housing
low-level border crossing offenders and minor felony convicts) in
hopes that the prison would create jobs and boost the county's
economy. While the prison was operational, it employed over four
hundred people. 94 Additionally, Willacy County received $2.50 per
prisoner per day from the contractor, Management & Training
Corporation (MTC), for the use of the government-constructed
prison-potentially earning the County $3 million this year.95
However, after the riot, the Federal Bureau of Prisons, which
oversaw the prison, canceled the prison management contract with
9 0 Id.
91 Tuohy, supra note 86 (stating that New Hampshire had 223 women
incarcerated across the state, all of whom were scheduled to be incarcerated at
the new facility when it opens).
92 Dolovich, supra note 27 at 457.
93 John Burnett, Closure of Private Prison Forces Texas County to Plug
Financial Gap, NPR.ORG, (Mar. 26, 2015, 3:49 AM), http://www.npr.org/2015/
03/26/39491 8220/closure-of-private -prison-forces-texas-county-to -plug-
financial-gap.94 Id.
95 Maurice Chammah, After Willacy, THE MARSHALL PROJECT, (Mar. 16, 2015
5:29 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/03/04/after-willacy.
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MTC. All 2,800 inmates in Willacy were transferred to other
facilities while the prison undergoes repairs, and Willacy County is
left with an empty prison in need of repair and $63 million in debt
from the initial construction. 96
Despite providing functions that can cover both the
construction and operations of a prison, private prison contracting
is fraught with challenges. Cost and time delays are endemic to the
prison construction, but using the private prison industry to
mitigate these risks introduces additional/different risks.
Governments are stuck without an easy solution with no relief in
sight.
C. The increase in American mass incarceration
1. Increasing prison population
Currently, in the United States, approximately 2.2 million
adults are incarcerated, 97 and an additional 4.75 million people are
under correctional supervision (probation or parole), bringing the
total correctional population to just under seven million people. 98
In comparison, China, which has billion more people than the
United States, nonetheless has a third less inmates than the United
States. 99
No other country approaches the United States'
incarceration population. Between 1980 and 2010, per capita
incarceration rates in the U.S. have more than tripled, growing
from 220 incarcerated people per 100,000 people to 731 inmates
96 Burnett, supra note 93.
97 Lauren E. Glaze & Danielle Kaeble, Correctional Populations in the United
States, 2013, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2 (Dec. 2014).
98 Jd.
99 Allen Hopper et al., Shifting the Paradigm or Shifting the Problem? The
Politics of California's Criminal Justice Realignment, 54 SANTA CLARA L. REv.
527, 537 (2014) (noting China has a population of 1.35 billion people, compared
to the United States' population of just under 314 million people, yet China
incarcerates only 1.65 million people).
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per 100,000 people. 100 In 2013, among countries with more than 1
million people, the United States' per capita rate of 716 prisoners
per 100,000 citizens ranks highest, far ahead of second place Cuba,
with 510 prisoners per 100,000 citizens. 10 1
According to a 2013 Bureau of Justice Statistics report, the
number of prisoners held in private facilities, both state and
federal, rose from 85,500 in 2000, to 124,000 in 2013, a forty-five
percent increase. 102 The Federal prison population grew from
24,640 inmates in 1980, to 214,149 inmates in 2014, a 769 percent
increase.103 Approximately thirteen percent (25,700) of federal
prisoners were housed in private facilities. 104
In 1990, there were only forty-four private prisons in the
United States, housing an estimated 15,000 prisoners. In 2000,
there were 264 private prisons (a 500 percent increase). Just five
years later, in 2005, there were 415 private prisons (a 843 percent
increase on 1990's number). 105 Ten percent of United States
inmates are currently housed in private prisons. 106
Jails, primarily used by local communities to house pre-
trial defendants and those convicted with short-term sentences,
100 Gopnik, supra note 2.
101 Walmsley, supra note 3.
102 Glaze & Kaeble, supra note 97, at 12. (During the same 2000-2013 time
period, public prisons rose from 1,225,700 to 1,352,500, a 10 percent increase. It
is interesting to note that federal private prison populations grew from 9,400
inmates in 2000 to 31,900 in 2013, a 239 percent increase; whereas state private
prison populations grew from 76,100 inmates in 2000 to 92,100 in 2013, a 21
percent increase.)
103 BOP: POPULATION STATISTICS, BOP.GOV, http://www.bop.gov/about/
statistics/population statistics.j sp (last visited Mar. 1, 2015).104 Id. (The total amount of prisoners was 209,824 on February 26, 2015.)
105 Peter H. Kyle, Contracting for Performance: Restructuring the Private
Prison Market, 54 WM. & MARY L. REv. 2087, 2092 (2013).
106 Ames, supra note 25, at 39 (noting also that private prison inmate "rates [are]
as high as 44 percent in some states."). Of this ten percent, CCA has
approximately four percent of the population (84,500 CCA prisoners in a total
population of 2,200,000), and GEO Group has approximately three percent
(73,000 GEO prisoners).
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have also seen a sharp increase in inmates. 10 7 From 1983 to 2013,
jails increased its population from six million to 11.7 million
inmates. The number of people in jail on a single day increased
approximately 226 percent between 1983 and 2013.108 During this
same time, the average duration spent in jail increased from
fourteen days to twenty-three days. 10 9 In 1983, there were
approximately ninety-six people in jail per 100,000 citizens, which
rose to an apex in 2007 of 259 people per 100,000 before declining
to current levels of 231 people per 100,000. In large cities, jails
often find that a majority of its admissions consist of a small group
of people who are repeatedly imprisoned and j ailed. 110
The Federal Government's Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) represents the fastest growing sector of prison
industry. The total number of detainees increased by 205 percent in
the ten years between 2001-2011, from 209,000 detainees to
429,000.111 In 2000, only 8,900 ICE detainees were held in private
prisons each night,1 12 but by 2011, that total rose to 33,330
detainees, a 274 percent increase. 
113
107 Subramanian et al., supra note 29, at 7.
108 Id. at 8 ("The number of people in jail on any given day has also climbed-
from 224,000 people in 1983 to 731,000 in 2013.").
109 Id. at 10.
110 Id. at 7-8 ("In Chicago, 21 percent of the people admitted to jail between
2007 and 2011 accounted for 50 percent of all admissions. In New York City,
from 2008 through mid-year 2013, just shy of 500 people were admitted to jail
18 times or more, accounting for more than 10,000 jail admissions and 300,000
days injail.").
"I Ames, supra note 25, at 35.
112 Cody Mason, Dollars and Detainees: The Growth of For-Profit Detention,
THE SENTENCING PROJECT, (July 2012), http://sentencingproject.org/doc/
publications/incDollars and Detainees.pdf.
113 Detention Management, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT,
(Nov. 10, 2011), https://www.ice.gov/factsheets/detention-management.
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2. The rising costs of incarceration
Along with the rising number of inmates across the U.S.
prison population, the costs of incarceration have also risen
drastically. In 2001, the estimated cost of housing one state
prisoner for one day was $62.05 ($22,648.25 annually) and a
federal prisoner was $62.01 ($22,633.65 annually).11 4 By contrast,
in 2009, the average cost of incarcerating a person for one day was
$78.88 (amounting to $28,791.20 annually), a 27.2 percent
increase. 115 The state of New Hampshire released a report in 2013,
where it estimated the costs of housing a male inmate in 2012, at
$36,435, and a female at $37,573.116 The state also estimated that
the projected cost in 2033, would be $61,050 for male inmates and
$74,631 for female inmates.1 1 7 The cost of housing a juvenile is
nearly six times higher than an adult, at $366.88 per day or
$133,911.20 per year.11 8
The costs of housing a prisoner in a private prison can be
even higher. A 2011 Arizona Department of Corrections report
showed that private prisons can cost as much as $1,680 more per
year to house an inmate than a public prison.11 9 This increase is
114 Fulcher supra note 15, at 603.
115 Paul Ashton & Amanda Petteruti, Gaming the System: How the Political
Strategies of Private Prison Companies Promote Ineffective Incarceration
Policies, JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE, 31 (June 2011),
http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/j usticepolicy/documents/gaming thesyste
m.pdf.
116 DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS & DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE
SERVICES, REPORT ON REVIEW OF CORRECTIONAL FACILITY RFPs 1356-12,
1380-12 AND 1387-12, STATE.NH.US, 8 http://admin.state.nh.us/purchasing/
State%20Summary%20Reporto2OFinal.pdf (last visited Mar. 2, 2015).
117 Id.
118 Maurice Chammah, The 17-Year-Old Adults, THE MARSHALL PROJECT,
(Mar. 3, 2015), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/03/03/the-17-year-old-
adults.
11' BIENNIAL COMPARISON OF "PRIVATE VERSUS PUBLIC PROVISION OF
SERVICES" REQUIRED PER A.R.S. § 41-1609.01(K)(M), CORRECTIONS.AZ. Gov,
61, (2011), https://corrections.az.gov/sites/default/files/ars41_1609 01
biennial comparison reportl22111 e v.pdf ($1,680 yearly savings calculated
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especially stark because private prisoners typically require less
significant attention to physical, health, or mental concerns and
disabilities.12 ° The medical costs that private prisons do not
provide can increase the cost of public prisons by a third.121
For minimum-security prisons, private prisons are only
saving $0.03 per day per inmate. That advantage is lost at the
medium security level, where public prisons cost between 4.4
percent and 8.7 percent less than its private counterparts. This can
add up to as much as $2 million per prison or $1,679 per inmate in
a year. A recent study of public and private prisons in Mississippi
shows that prisoners serving in private prisons generally serve
sixty to ninety days more than they would in a public prison, which
costs the state between $3,000 and $4,500.122
3. Imprisonment's growing burden on
society
Despite the high incarceration rates, imprisonment has lost
its effectiveness as a deterrent from crime. While the crime rate has
diminished in the past twenty-five years, there is no demonstrated
from the difference between the average adjusted medium custody per diems in
private prisons ($53.02) and public prisons ($48.42), multiplied by 365 days).
120 Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Private Prisons Found to Offer Little in Savings, N.Y.
TIMEs, (May 18, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/19/us/
19prisons.html?pagewanted=all. (For example, Arizona's eight private prison
contracts have clauses that prevented inmates with severe mental health issues
from being housed in the private prisons, while five of Arizona's eight contracts
contain terms that allowed private prison companies to reject prisoners with
severe physical disabilities. Private prison companies are also allowed to "return
[inmates who became sick] to state prisons due to an increase of their medical
scores that exceeds contractual exclusions.")
121 Id.
122 Anita Mukherjee, Do Private Prisons Distort Justice? Evidence on Time
Served and Recidivism, 31, (Mar. 15, 2015), http://ssm.com/abstract=2523238.
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correlation with the increase in imprisonment. 123 Instead, the drop
in the crime rate is attributed to increasingly sophisticated policing
strategies and an aging population. 124 A recent report has shown
that increasing incarceration levels by one percent will not
decrease the crime level in any statistically distinguishable
manner. 12  Surprisingly, lowering the prison population has
actually coincided with a drop in crime in some states. Fourteen
states that saw its prison populations decline in the past ten years
also experienced crime rates drop of at least 15 percent.1 26 With
these diminishing marginal returns on incarceration, states are
finding it increasingly difficult to justify incarcerating non-violent
offenders.
California, whose infamous Three Strikes law 127 sought to
dissuade crime by levying life sentences to repeat offenders led to
massive overpopulation in its state prisons, provides an interesting
example. Unfortunately, due to the increased prison population,
Three Strikes is directly responsible for a $19.2 billion prison
budget increase in the state. 128 In Brown v. Plata,129 the Supreme
123 Chettiar, supra note 14 ("Crime is about half of what it was at its peak in
1991. Violent crime plummeted 51 percent. Property crime fell 43 percent.
Homicides are down 54 percent.").
124 Id.
125 Oliver Roeder et al., What Caused the Crime Decline? Brennan Center for
Justice, at 23 (2015), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/
publications/What CausedTheCrime Decline.pdf.
126 Chettiar, supra note 14 ("New York reduced imprisonment by 26 percent,
while seeing a 28 percent reduction in crime. Imprisonment and crime both
decreased by more than 15 percent in California, Maryland, New Jersey, New
York, and Texas. Eight states-Connecticut, Delaware, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Nevada, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Utah-lowered its
imprisonment rates be 2 to 15 percent while seeing more than a 15 percent
decrease in crime.").
127 CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (2016).
128 CALIFORNIA STATE AUDITOR, CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
AND REHABILITATION: INMATES SENTENCED UNDER THE THREE STRIKES LAW
AND A SMALL NUMBER OF INMATES RECEIVING SPECIALTY HEALTH CARE
REPRESENT SIGNIFICANT COSTS, 2, (2010), https://www.bsa.ca.gov/pdfs/
reports/2009-107.2.pdf.
129 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011).
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Court required California to reduce prison capacity from the then
current levels, which could reach as high as 300 percent capacity,
to only 137 percent capacity.130 As a result, California began
releasing prisoners who were given life sentences under the Three
Strikes Law. As of February 2015, only 4.7 percent of the
approximately 2,000 inmates released were re-incarcerated after
committing new crimes. 131
II. PROBLEMS CURRENTLY WITH FIXED-
PRICE CONTRACTS FOR PRISONS
Despite no reliable data showing that private prisons
deliver promised cost savings, the private prison industry is
growing. To understand why private prisons may not be delivering
its purported, sometimes legally required cost savings,132 it is first
important to understand how private prison contracts are
constructed. By examining the standard fixed-price per diem
contract private prisons use, this section will show why this
contracting approach favors the private prison industry over the
government. First, this section will describe how fixed-price
contracts work and why they may fail to meet the governments'
needs for prison contracts. Then this section will discuss some of
the problems associated with the current fixed-price contract
structure, in particular, those problems related to quotas,
correctional staffing costs, termination clauses and the resulting
lack of transparency.
130 SIVON, supra note 41, at 7.
131 Erik Eckholm, Out of Prison, and Staying Out, After 3rd Strike, N.Y. TIMEs,
Feb. 26, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/27/us/california-convicts-are-
out-of-prison-after-third-strike-and-staying-out.html.
132 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1609.02(B) (2015); FLA. STAT. § 957.07 (2014).
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A. Fixed-price contracts
A fixed-price contract is one that "provide[es] for a firm
pricing arrangement established by the parties at the time of
contracting." '133 Fixed-price contracting places the risks and
responsibility for the costs on the contractor. By providing a
known price on the value of the contract, the only way a contractor
will receive a profit is if it performs at a cost below the agreed
upon fixed-price. Thus, fixed-price contracting works best when
purchasing items that have a known, definable cost, such as
commercial items like office supplies or food. 134 While contractors
benefit from fixed-price contracting, because it allows them to
allocate resources without the normal risk of revenue changes, the
government benefits from fixed-price contracting because it is the
best method to incentivize contractors to control costs and leaves
the government with little performance administration.135
Payments to private prisons represent a variant of the
traditional fixed-priced model. Most, if not all, private prisons are
paid on a fixed per diem rate (often described as "per bed" or "per
bed night") for each inmate it houses. 136 Thus, the more inmates a
private prison houses, the more revenue that contractor will earn.
In general, a contractually guaranteed fixed daily rate is already a
huge advantage for contractors because it removes the risk of
revenue fluctuation. This advantage is amplified in private prison
contracts. While the rate is fixed, the number of inmates (and thus,
the number of rates the company can collect) is not, allowing
private prisons to maximize profits by increasing the quota level or
the number of inmates. 137
133 NASH, JR., supra note 20 at 243; see 48 C.F.R. § 16.201 (2015).
134 Kara M. Sacilotto, Deja vu All Over Again: Cost-Reimbursement Contracts
Fall Out of Favor (Again), 40 PUB. CONT. L.J. 681, 685 (2011) (citing 48 C.F.R.
§ 16.202-1).
135 48 C.F.R. § 16.202-1 (2015).
136 Fulcher, supra note 15, at 601.
137 See supra II.Fixed-price contracts rely on quotas) for discussion on what
private prison companies have done to ensure that this risk is alleviated.
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To maximize the benefits of fixed-price contracting, both
the government and the contractor need to know the exact costs of
the inputs. 138 The government is at a disadvantage when
contracting for prison services because the input costs are difficult
to estimate. The government may have only one point of
comparison, its own current prison systems, while private prison
companies have many facilities around the country from which to
learn best practices. Furthermore, the government often looks to
outsource the prison function when it is overburdened, making its
current system a poor comparison point. Without a central
government agency that can provide cost estimates and industry
norms for prison operations, governments are in a weak position to
maximize the benefits of fixed-price contracting in the private
prison context.
While fixed-price contracts lock in revenue for the
contractors, it does not lock in expenses, which are still susceptible
to market fluctuation. If expenses rise too high, the contractor can
only earn a profit if it cuts costs on those expenses it deems
unnecessary or expendable, such as staffing, food or programs.
When input costs rise, companies are incentivized to cut costs to
maintain profit, appeasing shareholders at the expense of inmates
and the government as its customer. 139
With fixed-price contracting, governments must be explicit
with what it wants to achieve from the contract. This becomes
increasingly difficult in private prison contracts where humans
become commodities and the cost aspects vary widely across
inputs, including health resources and the type of inmates received.
Because contractors have inherently broad latitude of discretion in
applying the vague cost standards, these contracts are susceptible
to contractor abuses and difficult to police. 140
138 48 C.F.R. § 16.202-2(c) (2015).
139 See inJfa II.When private prisons are forced to cut costs to ensure profit,
correction officers often bear the brunt of the cuts).
140 Dolovich, supra note 27, at 478.
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B. Fixed-price contracts rely on quotas to
guarantee contractor profits
Private prison companies typically are paid fixed per diem
rates for each prisoner it houses. While the per diem rate is fixed,
the number of inmates required to be in prison is not necessarily
fixed, thus creating an imbalance where the private prisons assume
the risk of running a fully operational facility populated with
insufficient inmates to cover its costs. To rectify this incongruity,
many private prison companies negotiate a quota for a minimum
number of inmates to be housed in a prison at any time, and, as a
result, nearly two-thirds of private prison contracts contain quota
provisions that call for contractually guaranteed minimum
payments of eighty to one hundred percent prison capacity. 141
Typical of contracts that include quotas, the government
often requires a per diem rate up to that quota, then a flexible rate
for each prisoner over that quota. 142 The quota system acts as a
141 IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST, supra note 63, at 6 ("Arizona has three contracts
that contain 100 percent occupancy guarantee clauses. Oklahoma has three
contracts with a 98 percent occupancy guarantee provision, while a couple of
Louisiana's contracts contain occupancy requirements at 96 percent, and
Virginia has one at 95 percent."); CCA 10-K 2014, supra note 54 ("For the
years 2013, 2012, and 2011, the average compensated occupancy of [CCA's]
facilities, based on rated capacity, was 85 percent, 88 percent, and 90 percent,
respectively.").
142 See Operations and Management Service Contract Bay Correctional
Facility, DMS#13/14-009A, 61, http://www.dms.myflorida.com/content!
download/90674/524385/BayContract - Executed Redacted.pdf (Bay
Correctional has a per diem rate of $48.53 for the first 90 percent, with an
additional $3.52 for each prisoner over 90 percent); Operations and
Management Service Contract Moore Haven Correctional Facility,
DMS#13/14-009B, 61, http://www.dms.myflorida.com/content/download/
91291/526701/MooreHavenContract - ExecutedRedacted.pdf (explaining
that Moore Haven has a per diem rate of $48.18 for the first 90 percent capacity,
and $3.65 for each additional prisoner); Operations and Management Service
Contract Graceville Correctional Facility, DMS#12/13-010, 61,
http://www.dms.myflorida.com/content/download/73740/437613/GracevilleCo
ntract DMS1213-010 - Executed-Redacted-OCRjodf AdobeAcrobat
Pro.pdf ($39.44 for the first 90 percent, then $3.94 for each additional prisoner);
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mechanism to help the contractor estimate its incurred costs so it
can properly operate. After the quota is met, using economies of
scale, the contractor is able to provide housing services to
additional prisoner at a substantially reduced rate. 143
Quotas benefit both the government and contractors. The
government, knowing its minimum costs, can budget accordingly,
while contractors know the minimum amount of revenue it will
receive. Quota minimums on contracts encourage governments to
ensure that no money is wasted. It also ensures that contractors will
be able to recoup expense it has incurred in front of the contract
(e.g. building the facility).
Many scholars view these quotas as capacity guarantees,
where the government will pay for a contractually obligated
minimum number of beds, even if prisoners do not occupy those
beds.144 These contracts should instead be viewed as variable
supply contracts. 14 5  For example, the Blackwater River
Correctional Facility in Milton, Florida has a 90 percent quota,
where the per diem rate is $45.80 for the first 1,800 inmates in its
2,000-prisoner facility, and $7.70 for each additional prisoner. 146
Thus, the contract terms are actually $82,400.00 per day, with a
variance that can add an additional $1,540.00 per day to the costs.
Solitary confinement quotas are emblematic of the perverse
incentives that result when using a quota system in prison
Amendment #7 Operations and Management Service Contract South Bay
Correctional Facility, 08/09-077, 4, http://www.dms.myflorida.com/content/
download/102644/585430/SBCF Executed Amendment #7 for DMS Websit
e.pdf ($48.85 for the first 90 percent, then $7.00 for each additional inmate).
143 RICHARD W. HARDING, PRIVATE PRISONS AND PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY,
104 (1997).
144 See Ames, supra note 25, at 40; Alex Friedmann, Apples-to-Fish: Public and
Private Prison Cost Comparisons, 42 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 503, 540 (2014).
145 See 48 C.F.R. § 11.701 (2015).
146 Operations and Management Service Contract, Blackwater River
Correctional Facility, DMS 08/09-026, 94, http://www.dms.myflorida.com/
content/download/90742/524628/Redacted Blackwater O&M Contract DMS
08-09-026[l].pdf.
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contracts. The Federal Bureau of Prisons contracts, for instance,
contain a quota for solitary confinement, which was set at ten
percent until last year, when it was halved." 7 Housing solitary
confinement inmates can be two to three times more costly than a
typical inmate.148 So, with a ten percent mandated quota for
solitary confinement, a prison is encouraged to use that space,
since the state is already paying for it. 149 The recent controversy
surrounding probable human rights violations associated with use
of solitary confinement complicates this problem, 5 ' especially
where juveniles housed in adult prisons are relegated to solitary
confinement for their protection. 5 ' Solitary confinement should
not be used solely because the government has a contractual
requirement to pay extra money to a private prison.
147 Carl Takei, A Most Unsurprising Riot, THE MARSHALL PROJECT, (Feb. 24,
2015 7:15 AM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/02/24/a-most-
unsurprising-riot.
148 The Dangerous Overuse of Solitary Confinement in the United States, ACLU
BRIEFING PAPER, 11, (Aug. 2014), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/
field document/stop solitary briefingpaper updated august 2014.pdf.
149 See generally Jerry R. DeMaio, If You Build It, They Will Come: The Threat
of Overclassification in Wisconsin's Supermax Prison, 2001 WIS. L. REv. 207
(2001) (discussing a similar problem in sentencing prisoners to higher security
prisons than their crime would normally command, which increases the costs to
the government and is worse for the prisoners).
150 See generally Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2208-11 (2015); Elizabeth
Bennion, Banning the Bing: Why Extreme Solitary Confinement is Cruel and
Far Too Unusual Punishment, 90 IND. L.J. 741 (2015); Peter Scharff Smith, The
Effects of Solitary Confinement on Prison Inmates: A Brief History and Review
of the Literature, 34 CRIME & JUST. 441 (2006); Atul Gwande, Hellhole, THE
NEW YORKER, 36-45 (Mar. 20, 2009).
151 See generally Jennifer Gonnerman, Before the Law, THE NEW YORKER, 26,
(Oct. 6, 2014); Jennifer Gonnerman, Kalief Browder, 1993 2015,
NEWYORKER.COM, (June 7, 2015), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-
desk/kalief-browder-1993-2015; Fred Grimm, Florida Still Sticks Juvenile




Incentive Contracts with Private Prisons
C. When private prisons are forced to cut costs
to ensure profit, correction officers often
bear the brunt of the cuts
When private prisons need to cut costs to preserve profits,
it generally elects to reduce staffing costs before enacting other
cost-savings strategies. Staffing costs, mainly salaries and
associated benefits, can account for nearly sixty to eighty percent
of the total operating expenses for a prison. 152 CCA estimates that
staffing costs accounted for sixty-five percent of its expenses in
2012 and 2013.153 Reducing staffing costs for a private prison is
easier than reducing similar costs in a public prison, because most
private prison corrections officers are not members of a union,
which would normally fight to maintain high salaries for
correctional officers. 154
Correctional officers, both in the public and private sector,
earn extremely low rates of pay, which have decreased in the last
twenty years. In 1998, a correctional officer in New York made, on
average, $36,000 per year.155 Today, the average starting wage for
corrections officers in many states is $15 per hour (approximately
$30,000 annually). 156 Moreover, wild disparities are seen between
various states. In California, new correctional officers can earn
approximately $38,064 per year, while an experienced correctional
152 Cassandre Monique Davilmar, We Tried To Make Them Offer Rehab, But
They Said, "No, No, No!": Incentivizing Private Prison Reform Through The
Private Prisoner Rehabilitation Credit, 89 N.Y.U.L. REv. 267, 279 (2014).
153 CCA 10-K 2014, supra note 53, at 56.
154 Id. at 24. (As of December 31, 2013, CCA employed approximately 15,400
people, only 800 of which were in a union.)
155 Eric Schlosser, The Prison-Industrial Complex, THE ATLANTIC, (Dec. 1998),
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1998/12/the-prison-industrial-
complex/304669.
156 Miles Bryan, States Face Correctional Officer Shortage Amid a Cultural
Stigma, NPR.ORG, (March 3, 2015 3:41 PM), http://www.npr.org/2015/03/03/
390229369/states-face-correctional-officer-shortage-amid-a-cltural-stigma.
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officer can earn $79,728 annually. 157 In a February 2015
advertisement searching for correctional officer job applicants in
the state of Alabama, the starting salary was listed as $28,516 (plus
benefits). These applicants were only required to be at least
nineteen years old, have a high school diploma or GED, and be
drug free. 158
Decreasing an already low salary for correctional officers
does not improve prison conditions. Private prison companies
experience high turnover rates with its staff. 159 Similarly, many
states are facing shortages in corrections staffing. High turnover
rates are associated with poor training and morale, which can lead
to high rates of violence in the prison among other concerns. 160
Training new recruits becomes more important when there
are high turnover rates among correctional officers, yet states have
decreased the amount of training a correctional officer receives so
that the workforce volume can be increased. For example,
California is decreasing the amount of training that Correctional
Officers receive, from sixteen weeks to twelve weeks, so that new
Correctional Officers can start their jobs quicker and the state can
train more Correctional Officers per year. Correctional officers
who have more training often command a higher salary, so this
decrease in training leads to lower salaries for most correctional
officers. California needs to add approximately 7,000 new
Correctional Officers over three years to properly maintain their
157 Jon Ortiz, Shorter California Prison Officer Academy to Start Next Month,
THE SACRAMENTO BEE, (June 23, 2015), http://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-
government/the-state-worker/article25344946.html.
158 Kelsey Stein, Alabama Department of Corrections Taking Applications for
New Officers This Week, AL.COM, (February 25, 2015 2:23 PM),
http://www.al.com/news/index.ssf/2015/02/alabama department of correcti_2.
html#incart river.
159 CCA 10-K 2014, supra note 53, at 49.
160 Bryan, supra note 156. (Currently, Wyoming is 20 percent understaffed,
Oklahoma is 33 percent understaffed, and Texas, Kansas, and Michigan also
face huge shortages on staff.)
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prison system. Even with the decreased training requirements,
California can only train 1,056 Correctional Officers per year. 161
Private prisons will often look to reduce labor costs as a
way to save money and maintain or increase profits when it uses
fixed-price contracts. Using cost-reimbursement contracts will
allow private prisons to maintain adequate staffing levels while
also keeping training at high standards. Without the incentive to
cut staff costs, the private prisons will find value in the better-
trained and more experienced correctional officers.
D. Termination clauses are not properly utilized
to ensure best value for the government
Terminations clauses, for convenience 16 ' and for cause,
161
are some of the most useful tools a government has to ensure
proper performance in its contracts. This is especially true where
the industry in which the government is contracting is plagued with
problems. However, governments are unable to fully utilize
termination clauses because of the dual presence of a private prison
oligarchy, with three major private companies controlling ninety
percent of the market, and a single buyer government
monopsony. 
164
161 Ortiz, supra note 157.
162 48 C.F.R. § 2.101 (2015) (Termination for Convenience is defined as "the
exercise of the Government's right to completely or partially terminate
performance of work under a contract when it is in the Government's interest.").
163 48 C.F.R. § 49.401(a) (2015) ("Termination for default is generally the
exercise of the Government's contractual right to completely or partially
terminate a contract because of the contractor's actual or anticipated failure to
perform its contractual obligations.").
164 Ames, supra note 25, at 39 (stating that CCA and GEO Group account for
approximately 75 percent of the private prison market share, while the third
largest private prison company, MTC, occupies approximately 15 percent of the
market.).
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Myriad stories describing reprehensible actions in private
prisons 16  should have concluded with terminated contracts;
however, the government has chosen not to act. Because
governments generally outsource when its facilities are at or over
capacity, desperate to find new places to put inmates, the
government is unable to terminate contracts with a poor
performing private prison because there is no alternative venue to
house the prisoners that are in the private facility. 166 Additionally,
when the private prison company often owns the building where
the prisoners are held, the government cannot simply re-compete
the contract for another private prison firm to replace the
terminated one.
Sharon Dolovich raises three characteristics of the private
prison industry that tend to show that termination does not provide
the necessary threat to maintain appropriate quality. 167 First, the
"only buyers in this market are public officials, spending other
people's money." 168 Second, there are a limited number companies
with the necessary "experience, resources, and infrastructure"
ready to replace a terminated contract. Third, the state would see
high costs associated with re-acquiring the prison responsibility,
165 Jerry Mitchell, East Mississippi Prison Called "Barbaric," THE CLARION-
LEDGER, (Sep. 24, 2014, 9:35PM), http://www.clarionledger.com/stoiy/news/
2014/09/25/east-mississippi-prison-called-barbaric/16242399/ (stating that the
East Mississippi Correction Facility, housing 1200 mentally ill inmates, was
sued by the ACLU and Southern Poverty Law Center when inmates did not have
access to water or working plumbing, assaults by officers and widespread drug
and violence); R.L. Nave, MDOC, Private Prisons on Trial, THE JACKSON FREE
PRESS, (Apr. 8, 2015, 6:00 AM),
http://www.jacksonfreepress.com/news/2015/apr/08/mdoc-private-prisons-trial/
(stating that a suit was filed against the Mississippi Department of Corrections
and private prison contractor Management & Training Corporation for
conditions at the Walnut Grove Correctional Facility, including "Reported
correctional officers trafficking contraband, drug use, daily gang fights, sexual
assaults ... and at least three riots").
166 Dolovich, supra note 27, at 495.
167 Id. at 495.
168 Id. at 495-96 (quoting Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 418-19 (Scalia
dissenting) (1997)).
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including start up costs and litigation. 169 States have been more
willing to terminate contracts when it has contracted to send
inmates to prisons out of state than when it has long term abuses
happening in its own state. 170
E. Transparency lost when using fixed price
contracts
While the majority of the criminal justice process is
conducted in open fora, the criminal justice system essentially
closes to the public eye once the defendant is convicted and
sentenced to a term in prison or jail. The conditions in which a
person serves their sentence can significantly impact their life
during and after incarceration, where health, psychological, and
social issues can emerge as a result of incarceration. 171 Not only is
it in the inmates' best interest to be treated with dignity, it is also in
the government's and citizenry's interest, those ultimately paying
the dollar and societal costs of imprisonment, to know how
inmates are being treated.
Fixed-price contracts should only be used when "available
cost or pricing information permits realistic estimates of the
probable costs of performance." 172 Prison services are unique in
that prisoners are the commodities, with private prisons being paid
a fixed-price per diem for each prisoner housed. There is a wide
variance of health and mental problems among prisoners. Many
prisoners could have drug or alcohol issues 173 that would increase
the cost to a private prison to house that prisoner. Governments
and private prisons cannot adequately place a fixed-price on the
wide array of prisoners who will enter the private prison with any
1691d. at 496.
170 Id. at 497-99.
171 Andrea Annstrong, No Prisoner Left Behind? Enhancing Public
Transparency of Penal Institutions, 25 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 435, 437 (2014).
172 48 C.F.R. § 16.202-2(c) (2015).
173 See supra III.B.Drug and alcohol rehabilitation).
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degree of certainty that the price will meet basic government
contracting standards.
In relation to other government programs, prisons are
uniquely closed to the public.174 Because prisons are closed to the
public, there is likely less public scrutiny to the conditions in
prisons. In order to ensure that there is little public knowledge of
prisons, many prisons strictly restrict media access, only giving
access on the prisons' own terms. 175
Furthermore, prisons lack the transparency and oversight
that could make them truly effective. 176 There are several factors
that contribute to a closed prison system. First, prisoners face
higher barriers to sue when they have been mistreated. 177 The
Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996 (PLRA) was enacted to
prevent prisoners from filing frivolous inmate lawsuits. 178 Instead,
the PLRA has made filing any lawsuit, frivolous or not, nearly
impossible for an inmate. The main barrier created by the PLRA
that prisoners face is the large filing fee that must accompany any
lawsuit. Filing fees are often waived for inmates, but a recent
174 See generally David C. Fathi, The Challenge of Prison Oversight, 47 AM.
CRIM. L. REv. 1453, (2010) (explaining why the lack of oversight and non-
standardization of prisons has brought more corruption and mistreatment.).
175 Armstrong, supra note 171, at 462.
176 Stojkovic, supra note 18, at 1486-88 (discussing the goals of prison
oversight: namely, defining the reasonable expectations a society can have of
prisons).
177 See generally Lynn S. Branham, Of Mice and Prisoners: The
Constitutionality of Extending Prisoners' Confinement for Filing Frivolous
Lawsuits, 75 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1021 (2002); Sharon I. Fiedler, Past Wrongs,
Present Futility, and the Future of Prisoner Relief: A Reasonable Interpretation
of"Available" in the Context of the PLRA, 33 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 713 (2000).
178 Alysia Santo, Suing From Prison, THE MARSHALL PROJECT, (February 18,
2015 4:45 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/02/18/suing-from-
prison ("During the debate in Congress over the law, PLRA proponents liked to
cite the tale of an inmate who sued because the prison canteen sent a jar of
crunchy peanut butter when he had ordered the creamy kind -- a prime example
of frivolous inmate litigation. But the issue was not the peanut butter. The
inmate sued because after he sent the peanut butter back he was still charged
$2.50, and he had no other way to recover the money.").
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Supreme Court case limited this waiver. 179 In Coleman-Bey v.
Tollefson, the Court upheld PLRA's three strikes rule, which
precluded inmates from receiving a waiver of the court filing fee if
they had three previous filings dismissed as frivolous, malicious,
or for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,
even if one of those previous filings is the subject of an appeal. 180
The plaintiff in this case earns seventeen and a half cents per hour;
if he worked his maximum allowable hours (thirty in a week) it
would take him two years to earn the money for the filing fee.181
Without lawsuits, it is difficult for prisoners to ever get relief if
they have been harmed.
Second, private prisons enjoy enhanced secrecy that other
facets of the criminal justice system do not enjoy. Private prisons
are usually not subject to Freedom of Information Act requests, nor
may they be sued for damages under the Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics standard. 182 Under
the same logic, because the private companies are operating the
facilities, the government is typically shielded from lawsuits
dealing with activity in the private prisons. 183
Third, there is a lack of reliable data that could provide
more information about how prisons are operated and which
programs are best suited for rehabilitation. This may be a result of
many factors, including the use of unreliable questionnaires and a
lack of resources for data collection among the prisons.184
Finally, many states try to obscure information about its
prisons for fear of how the public would react if they were aware
of the state of prison conditions. In February 2015, the Florida
179 Td.
180 Coleman v. Tollefson, 135 S.Ct. 1759 (2015).
181 See Santo, supra note 178.
182 Fathi, supra note 174, at 1462; see generally Matthew W. Tikonoff, A Final
Frontier in Prisoner Litigation: Does Bivens Extend to Employees of Private
Prisons Who Violate the Constitution?, 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 981 (2007).
183 Antonuccio, supra note 82, at 580.
184 Anstrong, supra note 171, at 464.
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Department of Corrections (FDOC) issued a gag order to its
inspectors, preventing them from releasing any public records,
discussing investigations, or otherwise providing information to
anyone.185 This came just two days after Florida legislators
questioned FDOC officials about complaints about prison practices
including inmate deaths, abuse on inmates by guards, and poor
medical care. 186
III. INCENTIVE CONTRACTS PROVIDES AN
ALTERNATIVE TO FIXED PRICE
CONTRACTS TO OBTAIN BETTER
OUTCOMES IN THE PRISON SYSTEM
Governments looking to outsource its prison function
should look at incentive contracts, instead of fixed-price contracts.
By using incentive and award-fee contracts, governments can
encourage private prison companies to offer more programs that
will lower recidivism rates, thus lowering the prison population.
These contract methods require more administrative maintenance
and support, and thus will force government oversight to ensure
that stated goals and outcomes are met. With current private prison
contracting, scholars have noted that a "for-profit prison operator
[has] almost no contractual incentive to provide rehabilitation
opportunities or educational or vocational training that might
benefit inmates after release, except insofar as these services act to
decrease the current cost of confinement." 18 7
185 Mary Ellen Klas and Julie Brown, New Prison Policy Punishes Investigators
Who Speak Out, MIAMI HERALD, (February 5, 2015 8:17 PM),
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/special-reports/florida-prisons/
article9371633.html.186 Id.
187 Patrick Bayer & David E. Pozen, The Effectiveness of Juvenile Correctional
Facilities: Public versus Private Management, 48 J.L. & ECON. 549, 549 (2005)
(cited in Lucas Anderson, Kicking the National Habit: The Legal and Policy
Arguments for Abolishing Private Prison Contracts, 39 PUB. CONT. L.J. 113
(2009)).
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The government has generally favored short-term solutions
to the problem of prison overcrowding and rising costs instead of
making a commitment to long-term goals. A current bill in the
Alabama State Legislature shows that increasing prison capacity
may cost the same as increasing rehabilitation services. Alabama
prisons are currently operating at over 195 percent capacity. To
reduce this overcrowding, the bill plans to spend $25 million a year
to reduce the prison population by 4,500 inmates, while allocating
$60 million over five years to expand prisons by 2,000 beds.188
These amounts show that it would potentially cost far less to
rehabilitate someone and keep them out of the prison system as it
would to incarcerate them.
Similarly, Rhode Island lawmakers tried to reduce costs in
the short term by sending seventeen-year-old juvenile inmates to
adult prison. The cost of incarcerating an adult ($40,000 per year)
is less expensive than a juvenile ($98,000 per year) because
juveniles have additional education and rehabilitation costs.
Because these seventeen-year-old inmates were housed in
isolation, away from dangerous adult inmates, the final cost,
$104,000 annually, was higher than that of a juvenile facility. The
high annual costs of housing a juvenile is more palatable when the
long-term benefits are considered; each juvenile who completes
their sentence, and becomes fully rehabilitated by completing the
required programs, can save taxpayers between an estimated $1.7
million and $2.3 million over the life of the inmate. 189 Those long-
term cost savings make the investment of the additional $58,000,
in Rhode Island's instance, a more attractive solution.
This section will continue by exploring the benefits of
incentive contracting, for both the government and the contractor.
This part will next address three potential programs that can be
188 Mike Cason, Bill to Reduce Alabama's Prison Population Draws Praise,
Raises concerns About Costs, AL.COM, (March 4, 2015 7:32 PM),
http://www.al.com/news/index.ssf/2015/03/bill to reduce-alabamaspiison.htm
l#incart river.
189 Chammah, supra note 118.
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implemented and expanded with incentive contracting: education
and job training programs, drug and alcohol rehabilitation
treatment, and mental heath programs. These three programs, if
implemented, can ultimately reduce the prison population,
therefore lowering the long-term costs of incarceration.
A. How use of cost-reimbursement and incentive
contracts can benefit the government by
focusing on long-term goals and solutions
Cost-reimbursement contracts provide that the government
will pay the contractor for all allowable costs incurred in
performing the contract. 190 Contractors are given a ceiling value
which limits the total amount of costs allowed to be reimbursed,
above which the contractor must obtain the contracting officer's
approval to raise.191 This reimbursement of allowable costs shifts
the cost risk from the contractor to the government. Typically,
cost-reimbursement contracts should be used when it is difficult to
estimate the cost of performance. 192 A contractor is paid a fee on
cost-reimbursement contracts, which is the contractor's profit from
the contract. 193 Recently, cost-reimbursement contracts have fallen
out of favor with the government. 194
By utilizing cost-reimbursement contracts, however, the
government can accomplish two goals. First, cost-reimbursement
contracts provide clarity to the closed private prison market by
requiring contractors to account for its expenses. Second, cost-
reimbursement contracts can lower long-term government costs by
encouraging rehabilitation programs. Focusing on rehabilitation
programs will lower recidivism rates, provide with job skills for
190 48 C.F.R. § 16.301-1 (2015).
191 Id.
192 48 C.F.R. § 16.301-2(b) (2015).
193 See NASH, JR., supra note 20, at 238.
194 See generally Ralph C. Nash, Cost-Reimbursement Contracting: Throttling a
Good Contract Type, 29 No. 3 NASH & CIBINIC REP. NL 12 (2015).
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post-release employment, and address their mental health issues
and drug and alcohol problems.
Cost-reimbursement contracts put the risk of expenses on
the government instead of the contractor. Without the risk of
uncompensated expenses, the contractor is not at risk of losing
revenue due to increased input costs. However, the contractor is
also limited to the amount of profit it can make. In fixed-price
contracts, by taking the risk of input costs, the contractor can
change its other inputs so that it can maximize profits. This ability
to maximize revenues is lost with typical cost-reimbursement
contracts where a fixed fee is the contractor's sole ability to earn
profit.
Award-fee contracts are subsets of cost-reimbursement
contracts 19 5 and fixed price contracts. 19 6 A cost-plus-award-fee
contract has two parts: a base-amount (which can be set at zero)
and an award amount.197 This model is best used when it is
important to the government that the contractor is motivated to
perform in a certain way or level of execution. 98 Cost-plus-award-
fee allows the contractor to have the benefits of shifting input cost
risks to the government, while retaining the ability to maximize
revenue with good performance. By changing to a cost-plus-
award-fee contract, the government can encourage private prisons
to offer programs such as job training, drug and alcohol
counseling, and mental health services. The government will pay
for the costs of running these programs, with the private company
realizing a fee on these services.
Using cost-reimbursement contracts would also address the
termination problem. If contractors do not fulfill its services, the
contract can continue, but the contractor will see lower profits.
Instead of incentivizing cost-cutting with fixed price contracts,
these cost-reimbursement contracts will encourage rehabilitation
195 48 C.F.R. § 16.305 (2015).
196 48 C.F.R. § 16.404 (2015).
197 Id.
198 48 C.F.R. § 16.305(b) (2015).
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programs and other similar options for the government.
Furthermore, cost-reimbursement contracts will encourage
innovation (which is virtually non-existent in the current fixed
priced model).199
While the government will likely incur more short-term
costs by switching to a cost-reimbursement contract and
incentivizing private prisons to provide rehabilitation programs, it
will save substantial costs by lowering the recidivism rate in the
long run, which will decrease the prison population and save the
taxpayers money. Treating inmates in rehabilitative programs will
not only keep them out of prison upon release, but will prepare
them for re-entry into society, and they will no longer be a burden
to their community, but rather an addition to the local tax base.
There is a large subset of people who are repeatedly
incarcerated, taking up not only the majority of the space in jail,
but also a majority of the funds used to jail them.2 °° If the
government were to find a better way to rehabilitate recidivists, it
will find cost savings from its non-use of the prison system, which
has become a crutch for the services prisoners really need.
Even a simple change in how we view ex-convicts can
change how they succeed once they are released from prison.
"Once you're labeled a felon, depending on the state you're in, the
... forms of discrimination-employment discrimination, housing
199 History, BOBBARKERNEWSROOM.COM, https://www.bobbarker.com/about-
us/history (last visited April 17, 2015). Of the few innovations I was able to find
in my research was a three tiered bunk bed made so that more prisoners could
sleep in the space that was built for two inmates, or worse, to be placed in
converted gymnasiums. David Muradyan, Review of Selected 2007 California
Legislation: Government: California's Response to Its Prison Overcrowding
Crisis, 39 McGEORGE L. REV. 482, 483 (2008). A more indicative example of
"innovation" occurred in Virginia, where public prisons commonly stored 30
days' worth of food-a holdover from the pre-industrial era-until it noticed the
possible cost savings that private prisons enjoyed by not continuously holding a
30-day supply of food. James F. Blumstein, Mark A. Cohen, & Suman Seth, Do
Government Agencies Respond to Market Pressure? Evidence from Private
Prisons, 15 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 446, 452 (2008)).
200 See Subramanian, supra note 29, at 7-8.
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discrimination, denial of the right to vote, and exclusion from jury
service-are suddenly legal. 2 °1 It is a system where one's debt can
202never be repaid to society.
According to a 2014 Bureau of Justice Statistics report,
sixty-eight percent of prisoners recidivate within three years of
release, and seventy-seven percent within five years.20 3 CCA
touted these statistics in a recent investor presentation.20 4 By
displaying high recidivism rates, some critics have argued that this
shows that CCA is not interested in rehabilitating, but simply
touting the high rates as a potential source for a good
investment.20 5 CCA also emphasizes that it wants to expand its
business to include the prisoner re-entry market.20 6  This
willingness should be taken as a sign to local and federal
governments that the private sector is willing to assist in
rehabilitating prisoners. If done in a smart, well-thought-out, long
term plan, governments can benefit from using this emerging
private market to assist with cost savings in both the prison sector
and overall.
B. Using incentive contracts to enhance the
benefits of in-prison programs
Rehabilitation programs, which assist inmates in
overcoming obstacles to prepare them to re-enter society after
201 Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT, (Dec. 6,
2010), http://prospect.org/article/new-jim-crow-0.
202 Id.
203 Matthew R. Durose, Alexia D. Cooper, Ph.D. & Howard N. Snyder, Ph.D.,
Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 30 States in 2005: Patterns from 2005 to
2010, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT (2015),
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/rprts05p05lO.pdf.
204 CCA Investor PowerPoint, Feb. 2015, slide 22 (last accessed April 3, 2015),
http://phx.corporateir.net/External.File?item=UGFyZW50SUQ9NTcwNTM2fE
NoaWxkSUQ9MjcxNjYOfFR5cGU9MQ==&t= 1.
205 Last Week Tonight: Episode ]] (HBO television broadcast July 20, 2014).
206 CCA Investor PowerPoint, supra note 204, at 26.
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serving their sentence, have been shown to lower recidivism rates.
For example, California's Preventing Parolee Crime Program
(PPCP) has shown great effects in offering programs to former
inmates to make the transition from prison to normal society
easier. PPCP programs include education and job training, and
drug and alcohol rehabilitation. Use of these programs has shown
significant benefits to those who enroll. An eight percent drop in
recidivism has been shown of those who merely attended (but did
not complete the program). Completion of two or more of the
programs has shown an astonishing forty-seven percent drop in
recidivism.2"7
Volunteers run the most successful rehabilitation programs,
and governments should demand similar returns from its private
prison vendors.2"8 A study looking at San Francisco's Behavioral
Health Court (BHC) treatment program for mentally ill defendants
showed that those who made it through BHC "were fifty-five
percent less likely to be charged with a new violent offense than
were their peers who had not been through the program," and
"BHC clients were twenty-six percent less likely to be charged
with any offense after finishing treatment., 20 9 Interestingly, after
three years of the program, BHC saved "$1 for every ninety cents
invested., 210  A similar program in Allegheny County,
Pennsylvania showed that re-offense rates were lower among those
who attended the health course, and the cost savings increased over
time, implying that there were long-term benefits. Courts similar to
207 Dusty Collier, The "Ideal" Pendulum Swing: From Rhetoric to Reality, 13
BERKELEY J. CRIir. L. 175, 189 (2008) (citing Sheldon Zhang et al., Preventing
Parolees from Returning to Prison Through Community-Based Reintegration,
52 CRIME & DELINQ. 551, 553-62 (2006)).
208 Adam Serwer, Permanent Lockdown, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT (Dec. 6,
2010), http://prospect.org/article/pennanent-lockdown-0 ("The truth is that most
successful re-entry programs focus on counseling and job training, relying on
the commitment of enthusiastic volunteers. We don't yet know which of these
programs can be effectively replicated by state and local governments.").
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BHC have shown to prevent future crime and provide cost savings.
A study showed that the costs saved by taxpayers could be as high
as $1,300 in health treatment costs and between $6,000 and
$12,000 in reduced costs associated with recidivism and
victimization.211
Private prisons boast about the programs it has to help
inmates; however, there is little evidence these programs are
effective, let alone more effective than similar programs within
government prisons. Again, when private prisons operate in a
closed market, it is nearly impossible to tell if the private prison
industry is fulfilling its advertised goal of providing useful
programs for inmates. Assessing an award-fee for successful
rehabilitation programs will allow for better results for the
prisoners in the program, and better data to the government as to
which programs are most effective.
1. Educational, vocational and life skills
Using cost-reimbursement or award-fee contracts can
encourage prisons to offer more GED or college degree programs.
A meta-analysis conducted by the Rand Corporation in 2013 found
that an inmate's potential of incarceration was forty-three percent
lower if they participated in an educational program while
incarcerated (versus those who did not participate in an educational
program).212 This lower recidivism rate leads to a savings of five
dollars for every dollar invested.213
When fixed-price contracts are used, the expense of GED
programs will come from the fixed-fees. CCA estimates that 3,000
211 Id. ("Cost-benefit analyses by the National Institute of Justice have
concluded that problem-solving courts save taxpayers about $1,300 in
treatments and other costs and between $6,000 and $12,000 per participant in
reduced costs associated with recidivism and victimization.").
212 Lois M. Davis et al., How Effective Is Correctional Education, and Where Do
We Go from Here?, THE RAND CORPORATION, 14, (2013), http://www.rand.org/
content/dam/rand/pubs/research reports/RR500/RR564/RANDRR564.pdf.213 Id. at 78.
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of its inmates earn a GED annually. 214 Similarly, GEO Group
averages 1,000 inmates earning a GED in a year. 215 This would
indicate that only 3.55 percent 216 of CCA's population and an
estimated 1.4 percent 217 of GEO Group's population are earning
GED degrees in a year. Private prisons will only offer such a
program if it does not infringe too much on cost. Shifting costs to
the government or awarding fees for performance will encourage
more of these programs.
Many prisoners lack formal education. In 1998,
approximately seventy percent of United States inmates were
illiterate. 218 Recent estimates suggest that approximately forty-
seven percent of those in jail do not have a high school diploma
nor a GED.219 A 2003 report from the Bureau of Justice Statistics
showed that only 25.5 percent of state prisoners and 40.6 percent
of federal prisoners had earned a high school diploma in 1997.220
Of the remaining 74.5 percent of state prisoners, 34.8 percent
received a GED during their incarceration, while 32.8 percent of
federal prisoners attained the same during their incarceration.221
214 The Recidivism Problem, CCA, http://www.cca.com/Media/Default/
documents/Social-Responsibility/Providing-Proven-Re-Entry-Programs/
Reentiy-Comiitnent-Fact-Sheet.pdf (last visited Mar. 2, 2015).
215 Rehabilitation, GEOGROUP.COM, http://www.geogroup.com/rehabilitation
(Figured calculated using GEO Group's estimate that 10,000 inmates received a
GED in the past decade) (last visited Mar. 2, 2015).
216 Using CCA's estimate from supra note 211 of 3,000 inmates per year earning
a GED, and using the estimate of CCA's total inmate population using the
nationwide average prison occupancy from supra note 60, we find that
3,000/84,500 = 0.0355.
217 Using the estimate from supra note 212 of 1000 inmates per year earning a
GED, and using the estimate of GEO Group's total inmate population using the
nationwide average prison occupancy from supra note 60, we find that
1,000/69,350 = 0.0144196... and 1,000/70,810 = 0.014122 .... thus between
1.41 percent and 1.44 percent.
218 Schlosser, supra note 155.
219 Subramanian, et al., supra note 29, at 11.
221 Caroline Wolf Harlow, Ph.D., Education and Correctional Populations,
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Of course, these numbers tell us nothing about the quality
of private prison GED programs (nor does calculating the
percentage of the population earning GEDs). Without additional
data, such as eligibility, enrollment qualifications and
requirements, it is almost impossible to tell if prisoners and the
contracting government are receiving the benefit that the private
prisons are implying they receive.
A recent editorial in the New York Times written by an
Attica inmate calls for increased college courses in prison,
especially free classes called Massive Open Online Courses
(MOOCs). 222 Before the rise of institutionalization, many colleges
offered degree programs for prisoners. These programs have
shown a low recidivism rate, yet had fallen out of favor.223 This
trend may be changing. On August 3, 2015, the Obama
Administration announced that they would allow inmates to
receive Pell Grants to attend college while incarcerated.224 The Pell
program had, at its height, 782 programs, 77,300 students and 252
degrees awarded, but was prevented from awarding inmates grants
with the passage of the 1994 Crime Bill.225
A troublingly faulty line of reasoning against college
courses being taught in prisons is exemplified by former
Massachusetts Governor William Weld: "We have to stop this idea
of giving free college education to inmates . . . otherwise people
222 John J. Lennon, Let Prisoners Take College Courses, N.Y. TIMEs, (April 4,
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/05/opinlion/sunday/put-schools-back-
in-prison.html.
223 Id. ("In Sing Sing, for example, one forward-thinking educational program
[Hudson Link], launched in 1998, has a recidivism rate of less than 2 percent.").
224 Federal Registrar, Notice Inviting Postsecondary Educational Institutions to
Participate in Experiments Under the Experimental Sites Initiative; Federal
Student Financial Assistance Programs Under Title IV of the Higher Education
Act of 1965, as Amended (Aug. 3, 2015), https://federalregister.gov/a/2015-
28010.
225 Mary Rachel Gould and Spearlt, Twenty Years After the Education
Apocalypse: The Ongoing Fall Out From the 1994 Omnibus Crime Bill, 33 ST.
Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 283, 288-89 (2014).
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who are too poor to go to college are going to start committing
crimes so they can get sent to prison for a free education. ' '226 First,
it is illogical to think that anyone who wants to go to college would
choose to do so in prison, even if college were then free. Relatedly,
Weld only said this because the prisons in Massachusetts were
making such great strides with rehabilitating prisoners that he had
to actually address the fact that providing a great service would
somehow incentivize crime. The conclusion that should have been
reached what that there are people who are desperate for an
education, who may not be ready for that education at the same
time others are. By seeing an example of a group of people, who
have been hard for educators to reach, finally become responsive
to an education, Weld should have seen this great success and used
it to create education programs to keep those people out of prison.
Prisons are trying to help by enrolling inmates in vocational
training programs, such as GEO Group's vocational training
programs, cognitive behavior programs, and education
programs. 227 CCA also offers many of the same academic and
vocational training services. 228 GEO estimates that over the past
ten years 40,000 inmates completed vocational training programs,
and 90,000 inmates completed life skills programs.229 CCA also
estimates that 20,000 of its 80,000 inmates currently participate in
vocational or life skills programs.23 ° While these statistics are
touted on the companies' websites, statistics on the impact of these
programs helping former prisoners in obtaining long-term jobs are
non-existent.
Even when a prisoner has a formal education, they may
lack necessary job skills that will translate to a long-term job. The
shift in incarceration theory from rehabilitation to simple
226 RONSON, supra note 27, at 252-53.
227 Rehabilitation, supra note 215 (including Weaving, Auto Mechanics,
Barbering, Cabinet Making, Carpentry, "Commercial Driver's License (CDL),"
and "Computers.").
228 The Recidivism Problem, supra note 214.
229 Rehabilitation, supra note 215.
230 The Recidivism Problem, supra note 214.
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confinement has caused many prisoners to leave prison with no
new skills and a deterioration or obsolescence of their skills once
they are released back into society.231 Even in situations where
new skills that are acquired, those skills may not have real-life
application.232
When inmates receive an education, problems will still
persist. Prisoners who re-enter society find barriers that preclude a
smooth transition.233 The social stigma of being a former prisoner
can contribute to difficulties in finding jobs, with sixty percent of
released felons facing long-term unemployment.234 A former
prisoner in Syracuse, New York was hired to sell cars, based on his
resume and an interview, but was subsequently fired after
completing an application where he disclosed he had criminal
convictions.235  But even when former prisoners can find
employment, they often earn forty percent less than non-felons.236
With the aforementioned barriers to entry in finding credible work,
231 Dolovich, supra note 10, at 245.
232 Id.; see infra notes 235-237.
233 See generally Carimah Townes, State House Passes Bill Rewarding Inmates
Who Pursue Education Behind Bars With Shorter Sentences, THINK PROGRESS,
(April 20, 2015 2:05 PM), http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2015/04/20/3648781/
state-house-passes-bill-rewarding-inmates-pursue-education-behind-bars-
shorter-sentences. (Illinois has recently introduced bills in its legislature that try
to ameliorate the problem of re-entry into society by encouraging prisoners to
earn a degree, no matter the level. One of the bills seeks to seal the criminal
records of those who receive a degree if they are non-violent felons, while the
other offers a 90-day credit on the sentence of anyone who completes an
education program. These measures are similar to those in other states and the
District of Columbia who have tried to remove criminal history questions on job
applications.)
234 Chettiar, supra note 14.
235 Marnie Eisenstadt, Car Dealer Fires Former Gang Member After
Syracuse.com Story About His Success, SYRACUSE.COM, (June 17, 2015, 5:20
PM), http://www. syracuse.com/news/index.ssf/2015/06/car dealer fires-
former gangmember after syracusecom storyabout his success.html.
236 Chettiar, supra note 14.
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many former prisoners resort to crime, contributing to high
recidivism rates.237
The Prison Industry Enhancement Certification Program
(PIE) programs 238 focus on rehabilitation and creating job skills to
ease the transition for inmates re-entering society. There is some
evidence that inmates who work in PIE programs have an easier
time finding a job post-release than other inmates who do not
participate in similar programs. One problem facing the
government trying to incorporate PIE, or similar programs, is the
pushback by domestic companies worried about being undercut on
price by PIE. 239 This corporate pressure pushes prison labor to
obscure professions, such as "game-bird and buffalo
husbandry. 24 °
2. Drug and alcohol rehabilitation
Drug and alcohol dependency is the cause of many
problems in society, including the rise of drug abuse and
violence. 241 Drug epidemics and tougher drug use laws have led to
a higher rate of imprisonment for drug related crimes.242
Approximately sixty-eight percent of people currently in jail have
a drug or alcohol problem.243 The high proportion of inmates with
substance abuse problems stems from issues of addiction and
tough drug laws.244 Yet the amount of available drug treatment
237 Erin R. Yoshino, California's Criminal Gang Enhancements: Lessons from
Interviews with Practitioners, 18 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 117, 150 (2008).
238 See supra I.A (A history of government's use of private funding to defray
costs of imprisonment).
239 Groh, supra note 33, at 393.
240 Graeme Wood, From Our Prison to Your Dinner Table, PACIFIC STANDARD
(March 3, 2015), http://www.psmag.com/business-economics/from-our-prison-
to-your-dinner-table.
241 Stephen Raphael & Michael A. Stoll, Why Are So Many Americans in
Prison?, in Do PRISONS MAKE US SAFER? THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE
PRISON BooM, 62-63 (2009).
242 Td.
243 Subramanian, et al., supra note 29, at 11.
244 Raphael & Stoll, supra note 241.
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programs are diminishing. For example, from 1993 to 1998 the
number of opportunities for drug treatment in prison declined by
half.245 In 1998, only about ten percent of those who needed drug
treatment had the necessary help available.246 An estimated
twenty-six percent of former prisoners on probation abuse drugs,
compared to only eight percent of the total U.S. population.247
Nearly seventy percent of drug users recidivate within three years
of release; approximately forty-one percent of that population re-
enters prison for drug offenses.248
GEO Group reports that it provided drug and alcohol
treatment services for 100,000 inmates in the past ten years.249
Thus, on average, only one eighth of those who need counseling
receive it.25° Of CCA's sixty-six facilities, only fifteen had a
residential drug abuse treatment program (RDAP) in 2008.251
Unfortunately, there are no concrete numbers on how many
inmates CCA treats for drug and alcohol addiction.252
Drug treatment programs, when given in prison, have been
shown to effectively reduce recidivism and relapse. 253 By using
cost-reimbursement contracts and award fees, the government can
focus on those inmates who have addictions that factor in their
potential recidivism. By treating the problem at the source, the
245 Schlosser, supra note 155.
246 Id.
247 Peggy Fulton Hora & Theodore Stalcup, Drug Treatment Courts in the
Twenty-First Century: The Evolution of the Revolution in Problem-Solving
Courts, 42 GA. L. REV. 717, 721 (2008).
2 48 Id.
249 Rehabilitation, supra note 215.
250 Locations, supra note 58.
251 CCA Recognizes National Alcohol and Drug Addiction Recovery Month,
CCA.CoM, (September 2, 2008, 12:00 PM), http://www.cca.com/press-
releases/cca-recognizes-national-alcohol-and-drug-addiction-recovery-month.
252 Addiction Treatment, CCA, https://www.cca.com/innate-services/innmate-
reentry-preparation/addictions-treatment.
253 Dusty Collier, The "Ideal" Pendulum Swing: From Rhetoric to Reality, 13
BERKELEY J. CRIM\. L. 175, 189 (2008).
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government can encourage private prisons to treat addicted
inmates, leading to less recidivism.
3. Mental illness
The deinstitutionalization movement in the 1960s left a
void for those who need mental health treatment, making prisons
the default provider for mental health services.254 In the early
twentieth century, mental health care was predominately provided
by the state.255 In the 1950s, over half a million people were in
these state-sponsored mental institutions. By the end of the
century, deinstitutionalization forced the hospitals to close. As a
result, many of the mentally ill moved from the state mental
hospital system to the prison system.256
Over sixty percent of all incarcerated prisoners have
reported that they have dealt with symptoms of mental health
issues in the last year.257 Over half of all incarcerated people have
some kind of mental illness, 258 and over twenty percent of inmates
have a severe mental illness (e.g. bipolar disorder, schizophrenia,
major depression).259 Of those with a mental illness "less than one
half had ever received treatment for their illnesses before entering
the criminal justice system, and an even smaller fraction had ever
taken medication for their illnesses., 260 Even when in jail, those
with mental illnesses are left untreated. A reported eighty percent
254 Spearlt, Mental Illness in Prison; Inmate Rehabilitation & Correctional
Officers in Crisis, 14 BERKELEY J. CRIv. L. 277, 281 (2009).
255 Christina Canales, Prisons: The New Mental Health System, 44 CoNN. L.
REV. 1725, 1731 (2012).256 Id. at 1733.
257 Subramanian et al., supra note 29, at 12.
258 Spearlt, supra note 254, at 280.
259 Subramanian et al., supra note 29 at 12 ("Serious mental illness.., affects an
estimated 14.5 percent of men and 31 percent of women in jails-rates that are
four to six times higher than the general population.").
260 John E. Cummings, The Cost of Crazy: How Therapeutic Jurisprudence and
Mental Health Courts Lower Incarceration Costs, Reduce Recidivism, and
Improve Public Safety, 56 LoY. L. REv. 279, 286 (2010).
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of inmates with mental health issues do not receive the treatment
or help they need.261
Not only are those inmates with mental health issues more
expensive, due to increased health care costs, but they are also
confined longer than those inmates without mental health issues.262
In Los Angeles, inmates who sought treatment for mental health
issues averaged forty-three days incarcerated, compared to
eighteen days for those who did not seek treatment.263
Inmates with mental illnesses are disproportionately
homeless, unemployed and using drugs and alcohol before their
arrest. 264 There is an obvious disincentive for prisons, both state
and private, to treat prisoners with mental health issues because it
increases the cost of housing them in two ways: there is an
increased cost to provide mental health care to inmates, and the
total cost of imprisonment is compounded by the increased number
of days the inmate is imprisoned.
Due to these cost factors, Oklahoma, for example, has
recently cut its preventative mental health programs for both group
and individual sessions; an increase in the number of inmates with
mental health issues needing treatment, as well as an inability to
hire mental health professionals let to these cuts. Nearly a third of
inmates have mental health problems, but this decrease in funding
will result in treatment only to those with dire mental health needs.
261 Subramanian, et al., supra note 29, at 12.
262 Id. ("While most people with serious mental illness in jails, both men and
women, enter jail charged with minor, nonviolent crimes, they end up staying in
jail for longer periods of time. In Los Angeles, for example .... users of the
Department of Mental Health's services on average spent more than twice as
much time in custody than did the general custodial population-43 days and 18
days respectively.").
263 Timothy Williams, Jails Have Become Warehouses for the Poor, Ill and
Addicted, a Report Says, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/
2015/02/1 1/us/jails-have-become-warehouses-for-the-poor-ill-and-addicted-a-
report-says.html.
264 Subramanian et al., supra note 29, at 13.
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Since the cutbacks, the incidents of mental health events has risen
265forty-one percent.
By structuring contracts as cost reimbursement with
incentive fees, governments can incentivize private prisons to
provide mental health support. By focusing money on mental
health treatment, governments may be able to rehabilitate these
inmates, thus reducing recidivism raters by preventing repeated
arrests that stem from the underlying mental illness issues (such as
arrests due to homelessness). If private prisons could assist with
finding mental health solutions with those individuals,
incarceration rates may be lowered and those with mental health
issues will integrate into society, instead of being imprisoned with
no access to adequate assistance.
Private prisons can use its economies of scale to ensure that
prison facilities can hire and retain mental health professionals.
Currently, governments cannot hire mental health professionals
because they are unable to compete with higher paying
opportunities elsewhere. If governments are able to use the private
industry to improve mental health programs, private prisons may
be able to attract more mental health professionals to work in the
prisons.
IV. CONCLUSION
The government has used private contractors since the
beginning of the U.S. criminal justice system. Today, this practice
is more prevalent than it has ever been. Ever growing stock prices,
increasing revenues, and expansions into new, related markets
make it likely that the private prison industry will remain the
government's partner. Because private prison contracting will
continue within the U.S. criminal justice system, it is imperative
that governments use its resources to maintain a partnership with
private prisons while also ensuring cost savings and low recidivism
265 Clifton Adcock, In Prisons, Fewer Therapy Sessions for the Mentally Ill,
OKLAHOMA WATCH (Mar. 26, 2015), http://oklahomawatch.org/2015/03/26/in-
shorter-supply-mental-health-therapy-for-inmates.
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rates for the government. By using incentive contracts,
governments can ensure that both sides of prison privatization will
operate to benefit each other.

